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The eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004 triggered a large ﬂow
of migrant workers from the new member states to the UK and Ireland. This
paper analyzes the impact of this migration wave on the real wages in the source
countries. I consider the case of Lithuania, which had the highest share of emigrants
relative to its workforce among all ten new member states. Using data from the
Lithuanian Household Budget Survey and the Irish Census, I ﬁnd that emigration
had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the wages of men who stayed in the country, but
no such eﬀect is visible for women. A percentage point increase in the emigration
rate increases the real wage of men on average by 1%. Several robustness checks
conﬁrm this result.
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11 Introduction
If a high number of workers emigrate from a country, this should lead to wage increases
for those workers who stay behind. When in 2004 eight countries from central and eastern
Europe joined the Europen Union, this triggered a wave of migration from East to West,
as workers were able to earn much higher wages in Ireland and the UK than in Poland,
Latvia or Lithuania. The question is, whether this emigration wave had an impact on
the wages of stayers. An answer to this question can be important for other countries
that might join the European Union in the future and whose workers face the same kind
incentives to emigrate. Examples for this are countries in the Balkan region, such as
Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, etc.
In this paper, I test empirically the hypothesis, whether emigration leads to an increase
in the wages of stayers, exploiting the eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004
as a natural experiment. I choose Lithuania for my analysis, as this country lost a high
share of its workforce due to emigration after 2004. From 2004 to 2007 around 9% of
Lithuanian workers registered for a work permit in Ireland and the UK. To identify the
impact of emigration on the wages of stayers, I use variation in emigration rates and real
wages across gender, education, experience and over time, which follows Borjas (2003)
and Mishra (2007). The data come from the Lithuanian household budget survey, the
Irish census, as well as the data on UK and Irish work permits.
Using a reduced-form approach, I ﬁnd that an increase in emigration is associated with an
increase in real wages, but this only holds for certain groups of the workforce. While we
cannot see any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect for the wages of women, I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect of emigration on the wages of men. When interaction terms are included,
it turns out that the eﬀect is higher for unmarried men than for married men. For
a percentage point increase in the emigration rate, the real wages of men increase on
average by around 1%. For unmarried men, this eﬀect is 1.4%, while for married men it
2is close to zero. The results are conﬁrmed by a number of robustness checks. I also adress
the question of causality. While I can show that reverse causality is unlikely, it can be
the case that the results are driven by a third factor that leads to spurious correlations.
In the absence of suitable instruments, a combination of time and region ﬁxed eﬀects
accounts for this problem, as they absorb factors that can have an impact on wages over
time, such as FDI inﬂows, trade or EU strucutral funds. Given the fact that the inclusion
of those ﬁxed eﬀects does not change the signiﬁcance and magnitude of the eﬀects, this
indicates a causal relationship.
This paper relates to the scarce literature on the wage eﬀects of emigration. Mishra (2007)
analyzed in a careful empirical study the impact of emigration on wages in Mexico over a
time period of 30 years and found a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. Batista (2007) developed a
dynamic macro model to analyze the contribution of capital ﬂows and emigration to the
convergence of Portuguese real wages to EU average after the country’s EU accession.
She only found a small contribution of emigration. Kaczmarczyk et al. (2009) study
the migration impact on Poland and Hazans & Philips (2009) analyze descriptively the
situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They ﬁnd a higher number in vacancies after
2004, lower unemployment and a higher wage growth. These developments occurred
at the same time as migration, but the authors do not attempt to establish a causal
relationship.
My paper diﬀers from those papers as it exploits a natural experiment to show the impact
of emigration on the wages of stayers. From the results we can see that this impact can
be sizeable in the short run.
The paper is outlined as follows: section 2 describes the historical context of this study
and explains its theoretical underpinnings. In section 3, I describe the identiﬁcation
strategy and the empirical framework. Section 4 presents the construction of the dataset.
Section 5 contains the results of the main estimation and robustness checks. Finally,
3section 6 concludes.
2 Historical Overview and Theoretical Considerations
2.1 Historical Overview
On May 1st 2004, the European Union was enlarged by ten new member states, of which
eight were former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This enlargement
posed considerable challenges to the old (EU-15) member countries. As the freedom of
movement for workers is one of the core principles of the European Union1, workers from
the new member states would have been allowed to migrate freely and work in every
country of the European Union. Given the large wage diﬀerentials between the old and
new member states, some of the EU-15 countries feared negative consequences from the
immigration of cheap labor. Sinn (2004) calculated that around 5% of the population in
Central and Eastern Europe would migrate to the West after 2004. In countries with rigid
labor markets such as Germany and France, this would lead to decreasing wages of natives.
Moreover, as most Western European countries have generous welfare states, Sinn (2004)
expressed the fear of a wave of immigrants, who do not actually immigrate to ﬁnd work,
but to receive social beneﬁts and would be an additional ﬁscal burden. As a consequence,
the EU-15 countries agreed on transitional arrangements before the EU enlargement,
allowing countries to close their borders for workers from the new member states until
2011.2 Only Ireland, the UK and Sweden opened their labor markets immediately. While
Sweden noticed a comparably small inﬂow from 2004 onwards3, Ireland and the UK
became the major destinations for migrants from the new member states. From 2004-
2007, Ireland issued 391,618 work permits to nationals from the accession countries from
1 Art. 39 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
2 See Kahanec et al. (2009, p.4) for a description of the transitional arrangement.
3 Wadensjö (2007) reports around 19000 immigrants from the new EU member states to Sweden from
2004 to 2006.
4Central and Eastern Europe. The number of work permits issued in the UK in the same
time was 769,530.4 Some accession countries lost a considerable share of their workforce
due to migration. Figure 1 illustrates the number of emigrants relative to the workforce.
Lithuania, Latvia and Poland lost the highest share of their workers, whereas Hungary
and the Czech republic did not see big outﬂows of workers. The numbers reported in this
ﬁgure reﬂect an upper bound. The actual losses to the workforce might be smaller, as
not all workers who received a work permit in Ireland and the UK, were actually part of
the workforce in the source countries. However, this ﬁgure shows that emigration led to
sizeable changes in labor supply in Central and Eastern Europe.
2.2 Theoretical Considerations
A standard textbook model of a labor market suggests that emigration is a negative labor
supply shock that leads to labor shortages, which result in upward pressure for real wages.
Considering one single labor market implicitly assumes homogeneity of the workforce or,
in other words, perfect substitutability of workers. This assumption is implausible, as
a labor market is usually highly fragmented and the degree of substitutability between
diﬀerent groups of workers varies. Workers with the same degree of education are closer
substitutes than those with a diﬀerent education. In a specialized economy, even within
an education group, people working in diﬀerent industries are not perfect substitutes. For
example, a solicitor cannot easily replace a physician and vice versa, even though both
have a third-level degree. If we take this heterogeneity of labor market participants and
their various degrees of substitutability into account, a theoretical model, such as the one
proposed by Card & Lemieux (2001), predicts that a group of workers that is aﬀected
by an emigration shock, experiences a higher eﬀect on the wages of its own workers than
any other group. As emigration did not occur equally to all skill groups, this variation
4 Sources: CSO Ireland and UK Home Oﬃce.
5can be exploited to identify the eﬀect of emigration on real wages.
In their models, Card & Lemieux (2001) and Borjas (2003) assume that capital in this
economy is ﬁxed. If capital could fully adjust, migration would lead to capital outﬂows,
as a decrease in labor supply decreases the marginal product of capital. This was not
the case in Lithuania. Figure 6 shows that the capital stock in Lithuania was actually
growing from 2002 to 2006. In section 3.2, I will describe, how I account for those capital
ﬂows in the empirical model.
3 Empirical Framework
3.1 Identiﬁcation Strategy
To identify the impact of emigration on wages, I use variation in real wages and emigration
rates across skill groups and over time. A skill group is deﬁned by gender, education and
work experience. This deﬁnition follows the works by Borjas (2003), Ottaviano & Peri
(2006, 2008) and Borjas et al. (2008). The conjecture behind this idea is that workers
belonging to the same skill group compete in the same labor market. Those skill groups
in the workforce which saw large outﬂows of workers should have, on average, higher
increases in real wages than those groups who did not experience high outﬂows. This is
a feasible identiﬁcation strategy in the case of Lithuania, as the data about educational
attainment of emigrants is available from the Irish census. Their work experience is not
directly observable, but it can be calculated from the age and education of the emigrants.
The clustering of the workforce in education groups is based on the idea that
people within one education group are close substitutes in the labor market, whereas
people from diﬀerent education groups are not. In other words, a bricklayer with lower
secondary education will hardly be able to replace an engineer with a third-level degree
6and vice versa.
However, even within a particular education group, workers are not necessarily close sub-
stitutes if they diﬀer in work experience, as skill formation does not end with education.
Furthermore, workers acquire job-speciﬁc skills at their workplace, so that workers with
the same education and a similar work experience are close substitutes on the labor mar-
ket, whereas those with the same education but diﬀerent work experience are not. To
account for those diﬀerent degrees of substitutability within workers of the same educa-
tion group, I cluster the workforce in three education and nine experience groups. The
education groups are lower secondary school and less, upper secondary school and third-
level degree. The experience groups are clusters of work experience intervals of ﬁve years,
i.e. 0-4 years, 5-9 years, 10-14 years and so on. As the choice of those 5-year intervals is
arbitrary, I will also use 2-year and 10-year clusters for robustness checks. Section A.1
explains the clustering method in detail.
Additional sources of variation commonly used in the migration literature are geography
and occupations.5 In the case of emigration, information about the distribution of em-
igrants across industries and cities in the source country is not available, as emigrants
are usually not included in national surveys such as the census or the HBS. On the other
hand, the Irish census data does not state what Lithuanian region the immigrants came
from or what occupation they had prior to migration. There is information available in
the Irish census about their current occupation in Ireland, but this allows no conclusion
about their previous occupation in Lithuania. As Kahanec et al. (2009, p. 20) show, im-
migrants from the new EU member states after 2004 often took up jobs in the receiving
countries for which they were actually over-qualiﬁed.
5 See, for example Altonji & Card (1991) and Friedberg (2001)
73.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The basic empirical speciﬁcation essentially follows Friedberg (2001), who uses individual-
level data to investigate the impact of immigration in two-digit occupation categories on
real wages in Israel. Instead of occupations, I use worker skill groups as proposed by
Borjas (2003).
The basic empirical speciﬁcation used throughout the paper is
lnw
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ghjt denotes the log monthly real wage6 of individual i. mghjt is the emigration
rate of the skill group individual i belongs to. A skill group is composed of the follow-
ing characteristics: gender g (g=male, female), education h (h= lower secondary, upper
secondary, third-level) and experience group j (j= 0-4 years, 5-9 years,...,35-39 years,
40+ years). t is the relevant year of the cross-section (t=2002, 2003, 2005, 2006). The
emigration rate mghjt is a group variable that has the same value for all members of the
group in each year. Although all members of the group may not be aﬀected by emigra-
tion to the same extent, it is plausible that they are aﬀected in a similar way. Hence, I
expect the standard errors of the members of a particular group to be serially correlated.
This can lead to biased estimates, as reported standard errors can be much lower than
they in fact are.7 To overcome this bias, I cluster the standard errors on the level of
gender-education-experience-time cells.8 Throughout the whole analysis, I only consider
workers in the private sector. The argument for this is that the wage setting process in
the public sector can be inﬂuenced by factors that cannot be explained by competition,
6 Monthly wages are deﬂated by the Lithuanian HCPI. See table 1g) for the HCPI.
7 Angrist & Pischke (2009, ch.8) explain the bias resulting from clustered data and propose the
clustering of standard errors.
8 This makes an overall of 2  3  9  4 = 216 clusters
8such as political considerations or pay schemes based on seniority, family size, etc.
The coeﬃcient of interest is , which measures the average percentage change in the
real wage of a gender-education-experience cell, if the emigration rate of workers in this
cell changes by one percentage point.
Xi
ghjt is a vector of individual control variables (gender, marital status, a dummy for
urban areas, number of children). (t) is a vector of time dummies, which account for
changes in economic conditions that aﬀect every skill group equally over time.
(regi  t) is an interaction term between a vector of year dummies (t) and a vector
of dummies for the county (regi) individual i lives in. The interaction accounts for un-
observable changes in economic conditions across regions over time that may have an
inﬂuence on real wages. Examples are the inﬂow of EU structural funds, interregional
migration, FDI inﬂows or a change in the magnitude and composition of trade ﬂows after
EU accession. The inclusion of this interaction helps to diminish the endogeneity bias.
educh is a dummy for each education group h. It captures unobservable characteristics
that are common to the members of each education group and that do not change over
time. For example, workers with a third-level degree tend to work in white-collar occu-
pations, whereas workers with a lower secondary education rather have blue-collar jobs.
The choice of those jobs inﬂuences their earnings, but we cannot observe the individual’s
occupation from the Lithuanian data. A similar selection pattern might occur among
workers with diﬀerent levels of work experience. Within an occupation, older workers
might have diﬀerent tasks than younger workers. This diﬀerence can aﬀect their wages.
Such time-invariant unobservable characteristics of diﬀerent experience groups are cap-
tured by the experience group dummies expj.
All regressions are weighted with sampling weights given in the HBS. A sampling weight
is deﬁned as the inverse of the probability that an observation is included in the sample.
9The use of those weights becomes necessary, as some groups are over- and underrepre-
sented in the sample compared to the population. This sampling design of the survey
would lead to biased estimates. The weighting of all regressions with those sampling
weights eliminates this bias.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The core dataset used in this study is the annual Lithuanian Household Budget Survey,
which includes the characteristics and wages of stayers in Lithuania. The characteristics
of emigrants are taken from the Irish census data of the years 2002 and 2006. Finally, the
numbers of emigrants are extracted from the Irish “Personal and Public Service Numbers”
(PPS) and the “National Insurance Numbers” (NINo) from the United Kingdom. Those
data sources result in a pooled cross-sectional dataset covering the two years before EU
accession 2002, 2003, and the two years afterwards, 2005 and 2006. I deliberately omitted
the year 2004 from my analysis, as it is unclear, how many people actually emigrated in
2004. The registration numbers in the UK and Ireland in 2004 may reﬂect the fact that
workers had been living and working illegally in those countries before 2004, but only
applied for a work permit when Lithuania joined the EU.
The variables of interest throughout the whole study are real wages and emigration rates.
The real wages can be taken from the Lithuanian HBS. The emigration rates per skill
group are not directly observable and have to be calculated using information from dif-
ferent data sources. I take the skill distribution of Lithuanian emigrants from the Irish
census data. As there is no microdata about Lithuanian emigrants to the UK available
to me, I make the assumption that the skill distribution of migrants to the UK is the
same as the skill distribution of migrants to Ireland. As the total inﬂows of Lithuanian
workers, measured from the numbers of work permits diﬀer between Ireland and the UK,
I assume that the ﬂows to the UK per skill group are directly proportional to the ﬂows to
10Ireland. The number of work permits in the UK relative to the number of work permits
in Ireland in a given year describes this proportion. To obtain the emigration rates, the
number of emigrants in a skill group is divided by the number of people in the Lithuanian
workforce, who belong to the same skill group. In section A.2, I describe the calculation
of emigration rates and discuss the necessary assumptions in detail.
The following sections give a description about the data sources used in this study.
Lithuanian Household Budget Survey
The Lithuanian Household Budget Survey (HBS) is an annually conducted survey of
7000-8000 households. It includes individual characteristics of household members as
well as the income and expenditure of the household. The HBS is representative at the
individual level.
To match the Lithuanian data with the Irish census data, I restrict the sample to all em-
ployees aged 18-64. The variables taken into consideration are income from employment
of the household head and her personal characteristics, such as gender, marital status,
the number of children, etc. Self-employed workers are dropped from the sample, as their
income is decomposed in the HBS into several income categories which are not easily
traceable for most observations.
Table 1a) summarizes the properties of the HBS. Table 1c) indicates that the income
from employment for all groups has increased on average between 2002 and 2006.
Irish Census
The Irish census was carried out in the years 2002 and 2006 and covers all people that
are present in the Republic of Ireland in the census night. The Central Statistics Oﬃce
(CSO) of Ireland provided a tabulation of all Lithuanians in the census of 2002 and 2006,
their educational attainment, gender and age. The Irish census data makes it possible
11to calculate the gender-education-experience distribution of Lithuanian migrants, which
will be used to calculate the emigration rates from Lithuania for diﬀerent education and
experience groups.9 Table 1b) illustrates the magnitude of the emigration wave from
Lithuania after EU accession.
The diﬀerence in the magnitude of Lithuanian migrant numbers between 2002 and 2006
is noteworthy. Despite the fact that I do not have information about the year, in which
the immigrants arrived, this diﬀerence conﬁrms that most of the Lithuanians in the Irish
census came to Ireland around or after the country’s EU accession.
Tables 1d) and 1e) show the distribution of education groups in the Irish census and in
the Lithuanian HBS. The share of workers with a third-level and those with upper sec-
ondary education is lower among Lithuanian immigrants in Ireland than among stayers.
At the same time, the share of workers with lower secondary education is higher in among
immigrants in Ireland. This diﬀerence in the educational distribution indicates a pattern
of negative selection of migrants.
PPS and NINo numbers
As described above, the Irish census data can be used to determine the characteristics
of Lithuanian emigrants. However, the ﬁgures of the census are only a lower bound
to emigration numbers, as they are considerably lower than the ﬁgures reported by the
worker registration schemes in the UK and Ireland. In the time from 2002 to 2007, 63412
Lithuanians applied for a PPS number in Ireland and 90820 for a NINo number in the
UK. Figure 2 shows the migration pattern over time. Obviously, the large emigration
wave set in when Lithuania joined the EU in 2004.
All immigrants who wish to come to Ireland and want to take up legal employment,
are required to apply for a PPS number. Hence, the PPS numbers capture the amount
9 See section A.2
12of all labor migrants coming to Ireland, no matter how long they actually stay in the
country and what type of job they are employed in. There is no obligation to de-register
once a migrant leaves Ireland. Therefore, it cannot be concluded from the PPS numbers
how long immigrants actually stay in Ireland and how many return to Lithuania. The
NINo numbers in the UK are equivalent to the PPS numbers in Ireland.10 The UK
government introduced an additional registration scheme for arriving workers from the
new EU member states (WRS). The data on migration ﬂows from Lithuania to the UK
are similar to those from the NINo numbers, but they only cover the period from 2004
onwards. Hence, NINo numbers are more suitable for my analysis, as they cover the
whole time span from 2002.
The number of immigrants can generally be overstated in the PPS and NINo numbers,
as some Lithuanians might be registered in both countries. I will use the PPS and NINo
numbers as weights in the calculation of emigration rates in section A.2, taking into
consideration that they are an upper bound to migrant numbers and may contain double




I estimate the ﬁxed-eﬀect model in equation (1) with OLS, for which Table 3 (panel A)
shows the regression results. The basic results, including all private sector workers are
displayed in column (1). Controlling for observable and unobservable worker characteris-
tics, I ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of emigration on real wages. In economic terms, the coeﬃcient
of the emigration rate means that an increase in the emigration rate of a certain gender-
10 For further information about PPS and NINO numbers, see http://www.welfare.ie and
http://www.direct.gov.uk
13education-experience group by one percentage point, increases the wages of this group on
average by 0.6%. However, the coeﬃcient is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Given the high number of observations, we cannot conclude that this positive eﬀect in
fact exists. As we can see, men have on average higher earnings than women, the same
holds for people living in an agglomeration11 and people who are married. The variable
Children denotes the number of children under 16 living with the individual. The coef-
ﬁcient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, but economically negligible, as every child
decreases income from employment on average by 0.036%.
Within the population, diﬀerent groups of the labor force may be aﬀected diﬀerently by
emigration, for example men more than women, married people more than unmarried.
To account for diﬀerent wage eﬀects for men and women, I include interaction terms of
the emigration rate with the dummies for male (see table 3, column (2)). Furthermore, as
unmarried people tend to be more mobile than married people, unmarried people might
be more likely to emigrate, which gives them a higher bargaining power in their current
job. For this reason, the wage eﬀect of emigration should diﬀer between married and
unmarried people. I account for this diﬀerence in table (3) column (3) with an additional
interaction of the emigration rate with the dummy for married. This allows me to analyze
the wage eﬀects for four diﬀerent groups: married women, unmarried women, married
men, unmarried men.
Table 4 (panel A) reports the marginal eﬀects of a 1-percentage-point increase in the em-
igration rate on the real wages of diﬀerent groups. As we can see, there is a statistically
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect for men. For every percentage point increase in their emigration
rate, their real wage increases by around 1%. For women, we cannot see such an eﬀect.
A reason for the diﬀerent eﬀect between men and women might be the fact that emigrant
women might actually not be part of the Lithuanian labor force. In case they did not
11 The agglomeration dummy equals 1 if the person lives in one of the ﬁve largest cities of Lithuania
(Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Siauliai, Panevezys) and zero otherwise.
14emigrate out of the workforce, it is not surprising that we cannot ﬁnd evidence for wage
increases, as their outﬂow is not a negative labor supply shock. Another explanation can
be that women work in industries that are not aﬀected by emigration, so that no wage
eﬀect is visible. The obvious gender pay gap12 indicates such a self-selection behavior.
Considering the diﬀerent eﬀects for married and unmarried people, we can see that there
is no visible eﬀect for women. For men, we can see a sizeable diﬀerence in the eﬀects of
emigration on their real wages between unmarried and married men. At the same time,
unmarried men saw their real wages increase on average by 1.4% for every percentage
point increase in the emigration rate, while for married men, this eﬀect is close to zero.
Despite the fact that the eﬀect for married men is statistically highly signiﬁcant, the size
of the eﬀect is economically negligible. The diﬀerence in the eﬀects between married and
unmarried men can be explained by the diﬀerent degree of ﬂexibility of those groups.
Unmarried men have lower moving costs, so that they are more ﬂexible than married
men, who have high pecuniar moving costs, as well as the psychological costs of being
separated from the partner. Unmarried men are thus more likely to emigrate and those
who stay behind have a higher bargaining power towards their employers, as they have a
credible threat of emigrating.
5.2 Robustness Checks
5.2.1 Do the results suﬀer from reverse causality?
As the results in section 5.1 are derived using OLS, they measure a correlation between
emigration and wages. However, a causal interpretation of emigration on wages is only
possible, if we can exclude reverse causality. In our case, reverse causality would mean
12 See the coeﬃcients for the male dummy in table 3, column (3). Even in the absence of migration,
men earn on average more than women.
15that wages drive emigration. This can certainly be the case and would lead to biased
estimates. As I cannot entirely exclude reverse causality, it is important to understand
the direction of the bias. As it turns out, reverse causality leads to a downward bias
in the estimates of the parameter  in equation (1). As a consequence, the coeﬃcients
obtained in the regressions in section 5.1 reﬂect a lower bound to the actual eﬀects. This
can be shown as follows:
Take a simpliﬁed version of the model in equation (1),
lnw = m + u; (2)
where u is an error term. In case emigration drives wages, the coeﬃcient  should be
positive, as stayers become a more scarce resource because of higher emigration, which
leads to an increase in their wages. On the other hand, if we regress emigration rates on
wages, the regression becomes
m =  lnw + v; (3)
with v being the error term. The direction of the bias then depends on the sign of the
coeﬃcient . If wages were driving emigration, I would expect a negative relationship
between wages and emigration, so that  < 0: the lower the wages are, the higher the
number of emigrants. If those two eﬀects work at the same time, we can add equations








As we can see from this equation,  >  1
1 , which is valid as  < 0, so that the
estimate of the coeﬃcient  in equation (1) is a lower bound to the eﬀect of emigration
16on wages.
5.2.2 Are the results driven by a third factor?
Even if reverse causality is not an issue, the correlations found in table 3 may not lead to
a causal interpretation, if there is a third factor that drives migration and wages at the
same time. In case of the EU eastern enlargement, this situation is likely. The accession
of Lithuania did not only trigger a wave of emigration, the country could also beneﬁt
from a deeper trade integration, increased FDI inﬂows and the inﬂows of EU structural
funds. Economic theory implies that those factors, trade and capital inﬂows, increase
labor demand, which translates into higher wages. Hence, the correlation obtained from
the OLS estimates might be spurious and does not lead to any conclusion about causality.
One way to overcome this problem would be the use of instrumental variables. However,
in the context of the European enlargement it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd suitable instruments,
which are correlated with the emigration rate and not correlated with wages, as the EU
accession changed the economic conditions from one day to another, so that most vari-
ables will be correlated with wages.
Another problem that arises in OLS regressions when we do not control for additional
variables which drive wages, is omitted variable bias. Without the use of instrumental
variables, this bias cannot be entirely eliminated, but it can be reduced, either by the
inclusion of appropriate ﬁxed eﬀects or by the inclusion of observable variables, which
have an eﬀect on wages, such as FDI or trade. In equation (1) and in all subsequent
robustness checks, I include an interaction between a set of region dummies and a set of
time dummies. These interactions absorb changes in wages across regions over time and
as such, they absorb the variation that is caused by changes in labor demand over time.
The rationale behind this is that demand factors like inﬂows of FDI and EU structural
funds, as well as trade ﬂows, have a diﬀerent eﬀect on every region and on the wage level
17in this region.
As a robustness check, I omit the interaction region*year from equation (1) and include
log(FDI stocks), log(Exports) and log(GDP per capita) in the regression.13 Those three
variables are measured at the county level and denominated in 2005 Litas. Panel B of
table 3 reports the results for these regressions. None of the included variables (FDI,
exports and GDP) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In panel B of table 4 we
can see the marginal eﬀects of emigration on wages. Compared to the results in panel
A, the results in panel B have the same statistical signiﬁcance, but the magnitude of
the marginal eﬀects is higher for all groups. The question arises, which method is more
helpful in reducing the omitted variable bias. As the interaction terms region*year ab-
sorb all the developments that aﬀect the wages diﬀerently across regions over time, this
methods reduces the bias more than the inclusion of the three observable variables. Be-
cause the data on some variables, such as the inﬂow of EU strucural funds at a regional
level, is not readily available, the omitted variable bias should be greater in the latter case.
5.2.3 Do the emigration rates of other skill groups have an eﬀect?
The wages of a certain skill group do not only depend on the labour supply of this
particular skill group, but also on the labour supply of other skill groups. If diﬀerent skill
groups enter the aggregate production function of an economy as separate labour inputs,
a negative labour supply shock to one cell leads to a decreasing marginal product of all
the other cells and therefore lowers wages. To account for this interdependence between
diﬀerent skill groups, I augment the speciﬁcation in equation (1) as follows:
13 Source: Lithuanian statistical oﬃce.
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where mghkt are the emigration rates of all other experience groups within education
group j. mghkt are the emigration rates of the same experience group j but a diﬀerent
education group h.14 Table 5a) reports the results for the regressions of equation (5).
The sign and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients for the diﬀerent groups are the same as in the
basic model. The eﬀect of emigration on the real wages of men comes out slightly smaller
than in section 5.1, but the robustness test generally conﬁrms the previous results.
5.2.4 Do the results depend on the calculation of skill groups?
So far, I have controlled for a worker’s experience by including dummies for experience
groups. In the literature, work experience often enters the econometric model as a con-
tinous variable.15 This makes it possible to account for diminishing marginal returns to
work experience by including a squared term. The empirical speciﬁcation for this is
w
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where expi is the work experience of individual i. The results are displayed in
table 5b). They do not diﬀer a lot from the ones in section 5.1. Again, the emigration
rate does not aﬀect real wages of women. For unmarried men, the eﬀect is slightly smaller
than in section 5.1 and only signiﬁcant at the 5%-level. For married men, the impact of
14 Due to multicollinearity issues, it is not possible to include the emigration rates from all other
gender-education-experience groups.
15 See, for example, Chiswick (1978).
19the emigration rate on their wages is statistically not diﬀerent from zero.
In section 5.1, the workforce was clustered in 5-year work experience groups under the
assumption that within an experience group, workers are perfect substitutes. The choice
of those intervals, though widely used in the literature, is purely arbitrary. To check,
whether the results are driven by the way the skill groups are clustered, I re-run spec-
iﬁcation (1), using 2-year and 10-year experience groups. The results can be seen in
tables 5d) and 5e). In terms of sign and signiﬁcance, the coeﬃcients are equivalent to the
ones obtained in section 5.1. The marginal eﬀects of the 2-year cells are smaller than for
the 10-year cells. This diﬀerence can be due to the fact that 2-year cells allow for more
variation in real wages and emigration rates across skill groups.
5.2.5 Interaction year*education
When Lithuania joined the EU in 2004, this accession did not only trigger an emigra-
tion wave, but the country also got access to EU structural funds and received higher
FDI inﬂows. These factors can increase labor demand and as such have an impact on
wages. In the basic speciﬁcation of equation (1), I attempted to capture those factors
by including time ﬁxed eﬀects and an interaction of region and time dummies. The time
dummies capture unobservable eﬀects on the average wages of all workers in a given
year. The interaction region*year captures unobservable heterogeneous drivers of wage
changes across regions over time. However, neither the time dummies nor the interaction
accounts for heterogeneous changes in wages across education groups over time. The EU
structural funds beneﬁted particularly sectors that employ low-skilled workers, such as
the construction sector. In this case, the inﬂow of structural funds would have a greater
impact on the wages of low-skilled workers than on the ones of high-skilled workers. These
unobservable heterogeneous wage changes for diﬀerent education groups over time can be
captured by an interaction of the time dummies with the dummies for education groups.
20As we can see in table 5c), the eﬀect of emigration on the real wages is slightly smaller,
but in terms of sign and signiﬁcance, this robustness check conﬁrms the ﬁndings from
section 5.1.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I exploit a natural experiment to estimate the impact of emigration on
stayers. I choose Lithuania for my case study, which lost a high share of its workforce
due to emigration after the country’s EU accession. The main result in this paper is that
there is a positive eﬀect of emigration on the wages of stayers. However, this eﬀect is not
signiﬁcant for all groups of the workforce. While the wages of men increased signiﬁcantly
due to emigration, I cannot ﬁnd such an eﬀect for women. The use of interaction terms
revealed that the increase in wages was higher for unmarried men than for married men.
These results are plausible, as unmarried men are more ﬂexible than married men, which
gives them a higher likelihood to emigrate. If this translates into a higher bargaining
power, their wages will increase more than the wages of other groups.
The results turn out to be robust subject to a number of robustness checks. In the absence
of appropriate instruments, the question of a causal relationship between emigration and
wages can only be answered indicatively. Given that the EU accession was an exogenous
event and given that we control appropriately for other factors that might inﬂuence
migration and wages, the causality of emigration increasing wages seems likely.
While in this study I was only able to account for capital ﬂows using ﬁxed eﬀects, it would
be interesting to investigate the contribution of capital ﬂows to the changes in wages after
2004. For such a study, a structural model such as in Ottaviano & Peri (2006, 2008) is
needed. This could be the subject of future research.
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25A Data
A.1 Clustering: Education-Experience Groups
A.1.1 Education Groups
The Lithuanian education system oﬀers a variety of educational tracks and degrees.16 I
aggregate the diﬀerent education levels into three broad education groups for two reasons:
Firstly, the Irish census only includes ﬁve diﬀerent education groups (primary and lower,
lower secondary school, upper secondary school, third-level - no degree and third-level
degree), so that a matching of the educational attainment of emigrants and stayers is
only possible if broader education groups are considered. Secondly, in some cases diﬀerent
educational tracks in Lithuania lead to comparable degrees. For example, the basic school,
which students ﬁnish at the age of 16, and the stage I of vocational training. Both of
those tracks lead to a basic school leaving certiﬁcate. Thus, students holding either of
those comparable degrees can be seen as close substitutes on the labor market and should
be equally aﬀected by the emigration of workers with comparable characteristics. Tables
1d) and 1e) show the distribution of the education levels in the Lithuanian HBS as well
as in the Irish census.
I deﬁne the education groups as follows: Lower secondary school and less, upper secondary
school and third-level degree.
Lower secondary school and less People with 10 years of schooling or less. As
the Lithuanian HBS contains very few observations with primary school education or
less, I merge these with the category lower secondary school. Therefore, in terms of the
Lithuanian classiﬁcation, this category includes workers without any education, those
who only ﬁnished primary school, those with a basic school leaving certiﬁcate (usually
16 http://www.euroguidance.lt provides an overview of the Lithuanian education system.
26obtained at the age of 16) and those who pursued stage I of vocational training, which
also leads to a basic school leaving certiﬁcate. In the Irish census, this group consists of
primary school and less and lower secondary school.
Upper secondary school This category includes all workers having a degree higher
than a basic school leaving certiﬁcate (i.e. at least 11 years of schooling), but do not
hold a degree that would allow them to enter a masters’ programme at a university in
Lithuania or abroad. The dominant degree in this category is the Lithuanian A-level,
usually obtained at the age of 18. The other degrees of this category are stages II, III
and IV of vocational training and certiﬁcates from non-university third-level institutions.
In the Irish census, this category contains all workers with an upper secondary school
degree or a third-level education that does not lead to a university degree.
Third-level degree All workers with at least 15 years of schooling and a degree that
enables them to apply for a university masters’ degree in Lithuania or abroad. Workers
with a masters’ or a PhD degree are also included here.
A.1.2 Experience Groups
Within each education group, I cluster the workforce by groups of work experience.
Following Borjas (2003), workers of ﬁve consecutive years of work experience form one
experience group: workers with 0-4 years of experience, 5-9 years, 10-14 years, etc. up to
the group 40+ years. The work experience is not directly observable from the Irish cen-
sus data, but can be calculated. Assuming that people enter the labor market right after
completion of their education, the work experience is calculated according to the formula
experi = agei   educi   6, where agei is the age of individual i, educi is the duration of
her highest education individual i has ﬁnished and children usually enter school at the
age of 6. educi equals 10 years for workers with lower secondary school, 12 years with
27upper secondary school and 15 years with a third-level degree.
A.2 Calculation of Emigration Rates
Although the number of emigrants in each education-experience cell is not directly observ-
able, the available data allows me to construct sensible measures of emigration numbers
for diﬀerent skill groups. The idea behind the calculation is the following: take the
gender-education-experience distribution from the Irish census and weight it with the
corresponding numbers of workers who applied for PPS and NINo numbers in Ireland
and the UK. By dividing the calculated emigrant number of a certain gender-education-
experience cell by the number of people in Lithuania with the same characteristics, we
obtain the emigration rates.
The calculation of emigration rates requires three assumptions about the emigrants’
gender-skill distribution: 1) the distribution is the same in the UK and in Ireland. 2)
The distribution in 2002 is the same as in 2003, and 3) the distribution in 2005 is the
same as in 2006.
The ﬁrst assumption implicitly claims that no sorting behavior among mi-
grants between the two destinations Ireland and the UK could be noticed. This assump-
tion is backed by the recent literature on immigration to Ireland and the UK. When we
compare the descriptive statistics of the studies by Barrett & Duﬀy (2008, p.605) for
Ireland and Dustmann et al. (2009, p.23) for the UK, the educational distribution of im-
migrants from the A8 countries17 who came after 2004, looks fairly similar (see table 2).
Hazans & Philips (2009) analyze the occupational distribution of Lithuanians in Ireland
and the UK. On the one hand, there is a diﬀerence in the sectors that employ Lithuanian
immigrants in both countries. In the UK, around 30% of Lithuanian immigrants work
17 A8 countries are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slove-
nia.
28in agriculture, whereas in Ireland this share is only 5%. This result could lead to the
conclusion that migrants in the UK diﬀered in their skills from those in Ireland. On
the other hand, the same study shows that in both countries around 80% of Lithuanian
migrants work in sectors that typically employ less-skilled workers, such as construction,
health, trade, manufacturing, hotels and restaurants and agriculture. This indicates the
absence of sorting behavior, so that it is reasonable to assume that the skill distribution
of Lithuanian immigrants is the same in Ireland and the UK.
Assumptions 2) and 3) are reasonable as the education distribution among Lithuanian
emigrants in Ireland did not change signiﬁcantly from 2002 to 2006, even though the
number of migrants is nine times higher in 2006. As we can see in table 1e), the share
of immigrants with a third-level degree is slightly lower in 2006. At the same time, the
share of those with lower secondary education is higher, but both distributions - 2002
and 2006 - do not diﬀer a lot. Taken together, these three assumptions make it possible
to extrapolate the skill distribution given in the Irish census to the UK and to the years
that are not covered in the Irish census, 2003 and 2005. This allows me to present a
more realistic picture of the size and impact of migration ﬂows than we would get by
only using the Irish data for 2002 and 2006 without extrapolating. In the robustness
checks in section 5.2, I drop those assumptions. We will see that this has an impact on
the magnitude, but not on the sign and statistical signiﬁcance of the wage eﬀects.
For the calculation of the number of emigrants for each gender-education-
experience cell in the years 2002 and 2006, I use the number of Lithuanians in the Irish
census of the same year and multiply it with a weighting factor, which accounts for
the migration ﬂows to the UK. For the years 2003 and 2005, I additionally weight the
calculated number with the PPS and NINo numbers of those years.
Let xt
ghj denote the number of people in the Irish census of gender(g)-education(h)-














ghj is the calculated number of emigrants in cell ghj in year t. NINOt and
PPSt are the NINo and PPS numbers issued to Lithuanians in year t. The ﬁrst term in
parentheses (1 in this case), accounts for the fact that I consider the raw migrant numbers
in the census 2002 and 2006 for Ireland. The second term in parantheses, NINOt
PPSt , is a
weighting factor for the extrapolation of the migrant skill distribution of the Irish census
to the UK. If, for example, in 2006 the number NINo applications is twice the number
of PPS applications, this factor is 2. Table 1e) displays the ﬁgures of PPS and NINo
numbers issued between 2002 and 2006.
For the year 2003, I take the number of Lithuanian migrants in cell ghj of the year 2002















PPS2002 weights the number of migrants in the Irish census in 2002 with the change in PPS
numbers from 2002 to 2003. Suppose the number of Lithuanian immigrants in Ireland




PPS2002 accounts for the
change in PPS numbers, as well as for the diﬀerence in migration ﬂows to the UK and
Ireland in 2003.18















PPS2002 actually consists of two factors: NINO2003
PPS2003 , which accounts for the size of migrant ﬂows
to the UK relative to Ireland and PPS2003
PPS2002, accounting for the change in migration ﬂows to Ireland
from 2002 to 2003. By multiplication of those two terms, PPS2003 cancels out.
30For my econometric analysis, emigration rates are more relevant than absolute emigrant
numbers, as the coeﬃcient  in equation (1) can then be interpreted as a quasi-elasticity.
An increase in the emigration rate of one percentage point would then increase the real
wage by  percent.








ghj denotes the number of emigrants calculated in equations (7) to (9). The
denominator of equation 10 is the number of people in year t living in Lithuania and be-
longing to cell ghj. Due to the fact that I do not have data covering the entire Lithuanian
population, I have to calculate the number from the HBS. The HBS is representative at
the household level, so that I can calculate the total number of Lithuanians in cell ghj
by summing up the sampling weights pghijt
19 over all observations i that are in cell ghj
in year t.
19 The sampling weight pghijt is the inverse probability that observation i is included in the sample.
31B Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Year 2002 2003 2005 2006
a) Number of observations in the Lithuanian HBS, employees aged 18-64
All workers 3950 4136 4042 3874
Men 2322 2411 2426 2314
Women 1628 1725 1616 1560
b) Number of observations in the Irish census, employees aged 18-64
All workers 1904 - - 21779
Men 987 - - 12300
Women 917 - - 9479
c) Mean private sector income from employment in Litas, deﬂated
by the HCPI. Source: own calculations from the Lithuanian HBS
All workers 1084 1142 1339 1533
Men 1139 1216 1405 1628
Women 906 905 1107 1249
d) Distribution of education in the Lithuanian HBS
lower secondary 9% 10.6% 10.9% 9.9%
upper secondary 68.8% 69.0% 67.5% 67.5%
third-level 22.2% 20.4% 21.6% 22.6%
e) Distribution of education of Lithuanians in the Irish census
lower secondary 16.7% - - 20.4%
upper secondary 63.4% - - 62.2%
third-level 19.9% - - 17.4%
f) Numbers of work permits (PPS and NINo).
Sources: Irish Department of Social and Family Aﬀairs
UK Department for Work and Pensions.
PPS 2709 2394 18680 16017
NINo 1430 3140 10710 24200
g) Lithuanian HCPI, 2005=100, source: Eurostat
97.334 96.291 100 103.788
32Table 2: Distribution of education among A8 immigrants after 2004 in Ireland and the
UK
authors Barrett & Duﬀy (2008) Dustmann et al. (2009)
country Ireland UK
lower secondary 11.1% 11.9%
upper secondary 61% 56.1%
third-level 28.2% 32%
33Table 3: OLS, weighted with sampling weights. Men and women - private sector. De-
pendent variable: log(real wage)
A: interaction region*year B: Controls FDI, Trade, GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES all interaction interaction all interaction interaction
male male*married male male*married
Emigration rate 0.595* 0.318 0.326 0.617** 0.447 0.345
[0.3071] [0.3549] [0.3843] [0.3024] [0.3120] [0.3299]
Emigration * Male 0.737** 1.078** 0.931*** 1.623***
[0.3431] [0.4169] [0.3420] [0.4881]
Emigration * married -0.379 0.116
[0.4614] [0.4621]
Emigration * married * male -1.013* -1.532**
[0.5812] [0.6380]
Male 0.165*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.164*** 0.142*** 0.137***
[0.0184] [0.0200] [0.0207] [0.0184] [0.0193] [0.0207]
Married 0.523*** 0.525*** 0.550*** 0.525*** 0.526*** 0.548***
[0.0251] [0.0250] [0.0292] [0.0249] [0.0248] [0.0293]
Children -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.032***
[0.0110] [0.0110] [0.0110] [0.0109] [0.0109] [0.0110]
Agglomeration 0.382*** 0.380*** 0.382*** 0.381*** 0.379*** 0.381***
[0.0232] [0.0232] [0.0231] [0.0228] [0.0229] [0.0227]
log(exports) 0.006 0.002 0.005
[0.0821] [0.0822] [0.0825]
log(gdp per cap.) 0.615* 0.613* 0.617*
[0.3164] [0.3171] [0.3177]
log(fdi inﬂows) 0.025 0.024 0.024
[0.0164] [0.0165] [0.0165]
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Education Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Experience Group FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies no no no yes yes yes
Interaction yes yes yes no no no
Region*Year
Observations 9993 9993 9993 9993 9993 9993
Adjusted R2 0.3673 0.3677 0.3683 0.3667 0.3672 0.3679
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
34Table 4: Marginal eﬀects of emigration on wages for diﬀerent groups, results from table
3. P-values in brackets.







Women, unmarried 0.3303 0.3450
(0.3913) (0.2969)
Women, married -0.0448 0.4608
(0.6227) (0.4766)
Men, unmarried 1.4051*** 1.9768***
(0.0004) (0.0001)
Men, married 0.0198*** 0.5513***
(0.0031) (0.0005)
35Table 5: Robustness checks. Marginal eﬀects of emigration on wages for diﬀerent groups.
P-values in brackets.
a) b) c) d) e)
All 0.2061 0.4617 0.5438* 0.4517* 0.8532***
(0.5688) (0.1358) (0.0823) (0.0652) (0.0090)
Women -0.0288 0.1931 0.2876 0.1973 0.6373*
(0.9273) (0.6143) (0.4217) (0.4119) (0.0754)
Men 0.8529*** 0.8788** 1.000*** 0.9896*** 1.4486***
(0.0050) (0.0121) (0.0020) (0.0065) (0.0003)
Women, unmarried 0.0136 0.1675 0.2885 0.2486 0.6629*
(0.9679) (0.6930) (0.4600) (0.3920) (0.0892)
Women, married -0.3538 -0.0177 -0.0690 -0.1340 0.5533
(0.6950) (0.9056) (0.6833) (0.6233) (0.1963)
Men, unmarried 1.2074*** 1.1510*** 1.3445*** 1.2495*** 2.1188***
(0.0018) (0.0039) (0.0005) (0.0079) (0.0001)
Men, married -0.1034*** 0.0255** -0.0463*** 0.1499** 0.6376***
(0.0056) (0.0158) (0.0031) (0.04251) (0.0004)
a) Emigration rates of other cells included (section 5.2.3)
b) experience included as a continuous variable (section 5.2.4)
c) interaction education group * year (section 5.2.5)
d) 2-year experience cells (section 5.2.4)
e) 10-year experience cells (section 5.2.4)
36C Figures
Figure 1: Emigrant shares after EU accession: number of work permits in the UK and
Ireland from 2004-2007 divided by the number of employed people in the source country
in 2003. Source: Eurostat.
Figure 2: Number of Lithuanian emigrants to the UK and Ireland, measured by registra-
tion for work permits, i.e. PPS and NINo numbers, 2002-2007. Sources: Irish Department
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Figure 4: Scatter: wages and emigration rates for diﬀerent groups (male and female,
married and unmarried. Source: own calculations.)
38Figure 5: Wage increases for diﬀerent groups, 2002-2006, 2005=100. Source: own calcu-
lations, based on the Lithuanian HBS.
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